The method of science in Popperian epistemology

Abstract

The issue of the method of science within Karl Popper's epistemological
and philosophical paradigm is fundamental, as it consumed his thinking,
and his critique of induction as a method of science constituted a moment
of establishment and reflection in building a methodological conception

that distinguishes science from non-science on the one hand, and the
logic of knowledge from its psychology on the other hand. In this context,
it was necessary to exclude subjectivism that may spoil the objectivity of
science, and to make 'methodological decisions' that determine the
treatment of scientific issues and questions according to the critical
method, which is the method of trying and excluding errors. It is an
approach that makes knowledge proceed in successive loops, each loop
starting from the previous one and leading to the next, and each result in
turn creates an issue that requires reflection, and this is the essence of
the scientific method as a method that does not settle on an absolute
truth, nor does it fall into a rigid certainty, but rather makes every
scientific knowledge disprove itself if the conditions for its disbelief and
refutation are met.

Keywords: Method, induction, Karl Popper, error, refutation.